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This article reviews recent legislation and judicial decisions in
Virginia affecting owners, contractors, and design professionals in
the construction context. The discussion includes amendments to
the Code of Virginia promulgated by the General Assembly in the
1992 and 1993 legislative sessions, as well as important cases deal-
ing with construction law issues decided by Virginia's state and
federal courts in 1992 and the first half of 1993.
II. LEGISLATION
During the 1992 and 1993 legislative sessions, the General As-
sembly enacted a number of statutes affecting mechanic's liens,
public procurement, the statewide building code, and the general
regulation of contractors.
A. Mechanic's Lien Laws
The General Assembly substantially changed Virginia's
mechanic's lien laws in its 1992 legislative session with the passage
of Code of Virginia section 43-4.01.1 This added section establishes
new procedures by which persons who provide labor or materials to
one- or two-family housing construction projects may be required
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1. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, chs. 779, 787, 1992 Va. Acts 1217, 1239 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 43-4.01 (Cum. Supp. 1993). The passage of section 43-4.01 does not change the procedures
for perfecting mechanic's lien claims for commercial construction projects. Id. § 43-4.01(A),
(C).
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to perfect their mechanic's lien rights. The purpose of this amend-
ment is to give title companies additional protection from
mechanic's lien claims in order to encourage these companies to
continue providing, insurance against mechanic's lien claims.2
Under section 43-4.01, if the building permit for any new resi-
dential construction designates a "mechanic's lien agent," then the
party seeking to perfect a mechanic's lien claim against the prop-
erty must follow the procedures set forth in the section. If the
building permit does not include such a designation, then sec-
tion 43-4.01 does not apply and the claimant may file its lien as in
the past under other sections of Title 43.3
Where the building permit provides the mechanic's lien agent
designation, section 43-4.01 specifies that:
(1) The building permit must be posted on the property before
any labor is performed or materials furnished and must remain
posted until all construction work is completed;
(2) any mechanic's lien claimant must give the mechanic's lien
agent written notice by registered or certified mail of its involve-
ment in the project. The notice must include specific identifying
information for the claimant and state that the person seeks pay-
ment for the labor or materials furnished. Written evidence of de-
livery, or refusal of the mechanic's lien agent to accept delivery,
shall be prima facie evidence of receipt under the statute;
(3) the written notice to the mechanic's lien agent must be re-
ceived within thirty days after the first date that the claimant per-
forms labor or furnishes material, or within thirty days of when the
building permit is issued if the claimant began furnishing labor or
materials prior to issuance of the permit. If the claimant fails to
file such written notice as specified, it may still impose a lien on
the property at a later date, but only for labor or materials fur-
nished after notice is given; and,
2. See R. Gouldner, Changes in Virginia's Mechanic's Lien Law, VIRGINIA LAWYER, Sept.
1992, at 30, 31.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4.01 (Cum. Supp. 1993). The General Assembly also added a new
statute to Title 36 of the code which specifies that the building permit for one- and two-
family housing projects may include the name and address of a designated "mechanic's lien
agent." Act of Apr. 6, 1992, chs. 719, 787, 1992 Va. Acts 1217, 1239 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 36-98.01 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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(4) the mechanic's lien agent is required to transmit notices of
lien to the "settlement agent" upon receipt.4
In a separate amendment, the General Assembly specified that
the following entities can serve as "mechanic's lien agents:" (1) a
Virginia attorney; (2) a title insurance company authorized to write
title insurance in Virginia, one of its subsidiaries, or one of its li-
censed title insurance agents; or, (3) a financial institution engaged
in the banking or savings business in Virginia or a service corpora-
tion, subsidiary, or affiliate of such financial institution.5
Finally, the General Assembly added section 43-13.2 which im-
poses disclosure duties on the owner/developer of residential hous-
ing relative to mechanic's lien claims.6 An owner of residential
property, who is also the developer, contractor, or a subcontractor,
must provide an affidavit at the time of sale to the buyer. The affi-
davit must state that all persons providing labor and materials in
privity of contract with the owner have been paid, or otherwise
identify those persons in privity who claim to have not been paid
and also the amount of their claims. The section further states that
willful omissions or misstatements in the affidavit that cause finan-
cial loss to any person shall be punishable as a felony.'
B. Public Procurement
In its 1992 legislative session, the General Assembly amended
code section 11-61 to permit a contractor bidding on a public pro-
ject to furnish as security for the bid a personal or property bond
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4.01 (Cum. Supp. 1993). Mechanic's lien agents are entitled under
section 43-4.01 to enter written agreements relative to handling funds used to pay for labor
and materials for the project, and may charge a reasonable fee for the services rendered. Id.
5. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, chs. 779, 787, 1992 Va. Acts 1217, 1239 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 43-1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)). Elsewhere in the Code the General Assembly addressed the
duties of the "settlement agent" who will be receiving the notices of any mechanic's lien
claims from the mechanic's lien agent. The settlement agent is defined in section 6.1-2.10 of
the Code as the person "responsible for conducting the settlement and disbursement of the
settlement proceeds. . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.10 (Cum. Supp. 1993). The settlement
agent is responsible for informing purchasers of residential real estate of the availability of
title insurance, including mechanic's lien coverage, and to obtain a written statement from
the purchaser indicating whether the purchaser elects to buy such coverage. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6.1-2.13 (Cum. Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4616 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
6. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, chs. 779, 787, 1992 Va. Acts 1217, 1239 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 43-13.2 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
7. Id.
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or a letter of credit in lieu of a payment and performance bond."
The alternative security must be approved by the Virginia Attor-
ney General, in the case of state agencies, or the attorney for the
political subdivision, in the case of political subdivisions.9
In its 1993 legislative session, the General Assembly added sec-
tion 11-46.311 to the Public Procurement Act.11 Section 11-46.3 re-
quires contractors who contract with the Commonwealth or its
agencies to carry workers' compensation coverage for the duration
of the contract.12 The section also requires the contractor to supply
evidence of such coverage on a form to be provided prior to the
award of the contract.1 " The same obligation is imposed on all sub-
contractors on the project. Finally, the section imposes the same
insurance requirement on contractors and subcontractors doing
work for any locality after January 1, 1994.11
The General Assembly also amended code section 11-79 in
1993.15 Prior to amendment, section 11-79 barred a firm providing
architectural or engineering services to a public body from selling
to that body building materials or supplies to be used on the pro-
ject in question.16 After the amendment, any design firm, acting as
a subcontractor to the architectural or engineering firm in contrac-
tual privity with the public body, is similarly barred from designat-
ing itself as the sole source for any building materials or supplies
to be used on the project.17
Finally, the General Assembly amended section 22.1-140 chang-
ing the certification architects and engineers designing public
school construction projects are required to include in their
plans."8 Prior to amendment, section 22.1-140 required the design
professional to certify that "to the best of his knowledge and be-
lief' the plans complied with the board of education's regulations
8. Act of Apr. 5, 1992, ch. 765, 1992 Va. Acts 1187 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-61
(Repl. Vol. 1993)).
9. Id.
10. Act of Mar. 26, 1993, ch. 642, 1993 Va. Acts 882 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-46.3
(Repl. Vol. 1993)).
11. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35 to -80 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-46.3 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Act of Mar. 15, 1993, ch. 202, 1993 Va. Acts 228 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-79
(RepL Vol. 1993)).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-79 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
17. Id.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-140 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
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and the statewide building code.19 After the amendment, the de-
sign professional must certify that in his "professional opinion and
belief' the plans so comply.20 The obvious intent of the amend-
ment is to impose an express professional standard of care on the
designer such that negligent preparation will violate the certifica-
tion, as opposed to the previous standard based solely on the de-
signer's knowledge and belief.
C. Building Code Matters
In the 1992 legislative session, the General Assembly modified
section 19.2-8 of the code to provide a new statute of limitations
for criminal prosecution of building code violations. 1 With passage
of the amendment, criminal prosecution can be initiated within
one year of discovery of the violation by the owner or building offi-
cial, provided that such discovery occurs within one year after oc-
cupancy or use of the building or issuance of a certificate of
occupancy.22
In the 1993 legislative session, the General Assembly amended
code section 36-106 to specify the fines to be imposed on those
persons convicted of multiple violations of the Uniform Statewide
Building Code.2 3 A person convicted of a second building code of-
fense within five years of the first offense shall be punished by a
fine between $1000 and $2500. If the second conviction is more
than five years - but less than ten years - after the first offense,
the fine shall be between $500 and $2500. Any person convicted of
three or more offenses within ten years of the first offense shall be
punished by a fine of between $1500 and $2500. The fine schedule
is limited to building code violations which render the building or
structure "unsafe or unfit for human habitation. '24
During the 1993 session, the General Assembly also added sec-
tion 54.1-1115.1 to the Code.25 This new section permits the Board
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-140 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-140 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
21. Acts of Mar. 5, 1992, Mar. 23, 1992, Apr. 3, 1992, chs. 177, 435, 650, 1992 Va. Acts 229,
557, 956, (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8 (Cure. Supp. 1993)).
22. Id.
23. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 788, 1993 Va. Acts 1136 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 36-106
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
24. Id.
25. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 942, 1993 Va. Acts 1525 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
1115.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
1993]
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of Contractors, when conducting a hearing pursuant to sec-
tion 54.1-1114, to consider as evidence written documentation of a
building code violation provided by local building officials. Such
evidence, however, shall not be deemed prima facie evidence of
such violation.26
Finally, the General Assembly amended section 55-518 in 1993
to require the builder of new residential property to disclose to the
purchaser in writing all known material defects in the construction
which would constitute a violation of the building code.27 The dis-
closure obligation imposed by the section will not abrogate any
warranty imposed by law or contract that might otherwise exist
and cannot be disclaimed contractually by the builder.28
D. Regulation of Contractors
In 1992 the General Assembly amended two sections of Title 54
of the code regarding regulation of contractors. First, the General
Assembly changed the definitions of Class A and Class B contrac-
tors in section 54.1-1100.9 Class B contractors can perform or
manage construction-related activity for any project involving a to-
tal value of less than $70,000 as long as the total value of all con-
struction-related activity performed or managed for any twelve-
month period is less than $500,000.30 A Class A contractor's license
will be required if either the $70,000 single-project value or the
$500,000 annualized value is exceeded.3 1 Additionally, the General
Assembly amended the section to require a Class A license for all
landscape irrigation work, regardless of the value of the construc-
tion to be performed.32
Finally, the General Assembly amended section 54.1-1110 to au-
thorize the Virginia Board of Contractors to suspend, revoke, or
deny renewal of an existing license, or refuse to issue a license, to
26. Id.
27. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 824, 1993 Va. Acts 1195 (codified at V&. CODE ANN. § 55-
518(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
28. Id.
29. Act of Mar. 10, 1992, ch. 243, 1992 Va. Acts 303 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-






any contractor who fails to pay for unemployment or workers'
compensation insurance in violation of Virginia law.33
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Mechanic's Liens
Through numerous anti-lien decisions, the Supreme Court of
Virginia has created several procedural barriers to the valid en-
forcements of a mechanic's lien claim.3 4 The decisions by the su-
preme court in 1992 and the first half of 1993, however, may signal
a move away from an "anti-lien" orientation. In several cases, the
court ruled in favor of the mechanic's lien claimant and rejected
the procedural attack on the claim presented on appeal.
Since the beginning of 1992, the Virginia Supreme Court has de-
cided three new "necessary party" cases: James T. Bush Construc-
tion Co. v. Patel,35 George W. Kane, Inc. v. NuScope, Inc.,36 and
Air Power, Inc. v. Thompson.3 7 The necessary party concept is of
particular importance in the mechanic's lien context, in that fail-
ure to name all necessary parties in the memorandum of
mechanic's lien and/or in the suit to enforce the lien will render
the lien invalid, unless the claimant by amendment can correct the
defect within the time periods imposed in the mechanic's lien
statutes.38
In Bush, the supreme court ruled that the mechanic's lien claim-
ant had failed to add a necessary party to the enforcement suit. 9
The claimant, an excavating subcontractor, had filed a memoran-
dum of mechanic's lien prior to the recordation of a deed of trust
on the same property.40 After the deed of trust was filed, the sub-
33. Act of Mar. 10, 1992, ch. 243, 1992 Va. Acts 303 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
1110 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
34. Thomas M. Wolf, Virginia's Mechanic's Lien Statute - Needed Improvements to
Make It Work, VIRGiNA LAWYER, Sept. 1991, at 13-14.
35. 243 Va. 84, 412 S.E.2d 703 (1992).
36. 243 Va. 503, 416 S.E.2d 701 (1992).
37. 244 Va. 534, 422 S.E.2d 768 (1992).
38. See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Cooper, 239 Va. 71, 387 S.E.2d 468 (1990) (holding that origi-
nal lender, its trustee, and two condominium unit owners were necessary parties and failure
to name them in bill to enforce mechanic's lien claim within six months of filing of the
memorandum of mechanic's lien rendered claim unenforceable). For a discussion of the nec-
essary party doctrine in Virginia as applied to mechanic's lien claims, see J. Hart, Due Pro-
cess and Mechanic's Liens, VIRGNsaA LAWYER, Jan. 1993, at 22-27.
39. Bush, 243 Va. at 85, 412 S.E.2d at 703-04.
40. Id. at 85, 412 S.E.2d at 703-04.
6891993]
690 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:683
contractor filed a bill to enforce its mechanic's lien. The subcon-
tractor named the trustees under the deed of trust as defendants
in the enforcement suit, but did not name the deed of trust benefi-
ciary within the requisite six-month limitation period.41
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the mechanic's lien
claim was invalid because of the claimant's failure to include the
deed of trust beneficiary in the suit. The court reasoned that the
purpose of the mechanic's lien suit was to subject the liened real
estate to sale, and that such sale may not be sufficient to satisfy
the mechanic's lien and the subsequently filed deed of trust. Be-
cause the deed of trust beneficiary could find its lien "defeated or
diminished" as a result of the mechanic's lien suit, due process
considerations required that it be a necessary party to the pending
suit.42 The claimant's failure to include the beneficiary in the suit
within the required six-month time limit invalidated the
mechanic's lien claim. 43
41. Id. at 84, 412 S.E.2d at 704. The six-month limitation period for filing the bill to
enforce a mechanic's lien is found in § 43-17 of the Code. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17 (Cum.
Supp. 1993).
42. Id. at 88, 412 S.E.2d at 704-05. The Supreme Court of Virginia in Bush relied upon its
decision in Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 (1986), where the
court held that failure to include the trustee and beneficiary of an antecedent deed of trust
was fatal to the enforcement of the mechanic's lien claim. Robbins, 232 Va. at 47-48, 348
S.E.2d at 227. The Bush court refused to follow its earlier decision in Monk v. Exposition
Corp., 111 Va. 121, 68 S.E. 280 (1910). Bush, 243 Va. at 87-88, 412 S.E.2d at 705. In Monk,
the supreme court held that bondholders secured by a deed of trust and their trustees were
not necessary parties to a mechanic's lien enforcement suit, where the deed of trust had
been filed after the filing of the memorandum of mechanic's lien. Monk, 111 Va. at 122, 68
S.E. at 280. Obviously, the supreme court has become more sensitive to due process con-
cerns in the 80 years since it decided Monk.
43. Bush, 243 Va. at 88, 412 S.E.2d at 705. In a footnote, the Bush court did raise the
question of whether an amendment to the Code of Virginia section 8.01-6 while the case was
pending may have called for a different result, but the court expressed no opinion since
neither the parties nor the trial court had made note of the statute. Bush, 243 Va. at 88 n.2,
412 S.E.2d at 705 n.2. The amendment to Code of Virginia section 8.01-6 to which the court
alludes in Bush permits a plaintiff's amendment to its pleadings, which names a new de-
fendant, to relate back to the original filing if: (1) the claim asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the same transaction as that set forth in the original pleadings; (2) the party
to be added by amendment received notice of the claim within the original limitations pe-
riod so as to not be prejudiced in having to defend the case; and, (3) the party knew or
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been filed correctly -in the first instance. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6 (RepL
Vol. 1992). It is difficult to see how the amendment to section 8.01-6 could have had any
bearing on the outcome in Bush, however, since the suit was dismissed because of a failure
to include additional necessary parties in the original pleadings, and not because of a failure
to name the "proper party" initially.
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In Kane, the Supreme Court of Virginia had its first opportunity
to consider the "necessary party" concept in the context of Vir-
ginia's bonding-off statute.4" The subcontractor in Kane had filed a
mechanic's lien which the general contractor had promptly bonded
off with surety approved by the trial court. The subcontractor
thereafter filed its bill to enforce, naming as parties only the gen-
eral contractor and the sureties on the bonds. Over the defendants'
objection, the commissioner in chancery who heard the case ruled
that all necessary parties were before the court, which ruling the
defendants appealed to the supreme court.45
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the commissioner's rul-
ing, holding that the owner of the property and the beneficiaries
and trustees of the antecedenf deed of trust were not necessary
parties to the suit to enforce the mechanic's lien." The court ob-
served that the purpose of the bonding-off statute is to provide the
mechanic's lien claimant an alternative form of security for the
claim, while allowing the real estate to be freed of the encum-
brance so that further financing of the construction will not be
withheld.47 Upon filing of the bond, the statute specifies that the
mechanic's lien ceases to exist and the bond becomes the claim-
ant's sole security for its lien claim.48 At the point that the
mechanic's lien is bonded off, the owner of the property and the
beneficiaries and trustees of any deeds of trust no longer have "an
interest ... which is likely either to be defeated or diminished" by
the outcome of the ongoing mechanic's lien suit.49 Therefore, these
entities are not necessary parties to a bonded-off mechanic's lien
claim, and there are no due process considerations requiring that
they be included in the suit to protect their property interests.50
In Air Power the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed whether
a beneficiary of a land trust is a-necessary party to a mechanic's
lien enforcement action.51 In a land trust, the trustees hold both
equitable and legal title to the real estate, and the beneficiaries of
the trust possess only a personal property right in the "rents, pro-
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-71 (Repl. Vol 1990).
45. George W. Kane, Inc. v. NuScope, Inc., 243 Va. 503, 505, 416 S.E.2d 701, 702 (1992).
46. Id. at 510, 416 S.E.2d at 705.
47. Id. at 508-09, 416 S.E.2d at 703-04.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 509, 416 S.E.2d at 705 (quoting Mendenhall v. Cooper, 239 Va. 71, 75, 398
S.E.2d 468, 470 (1990)).
50. Kane, 243 Va. at 503, 416 S.E.2d at 704.
51. Air Power, Inc. v. Thompson, 244 Va. 534, 535, 422 S.E.2d 768, 769 (1992).
1993]
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ceeds, and profits" from the real estate.5 2 Given the unique legal
arrangements of a land trust, the supreme court noted that any
due process considerations the beneficiaries may be entitled to per-
tain only to the "proper distribution of rents, proceeds and profits
from the property, not in the property itself."53 As such, the bene-
ficiaries of the land trust are proper, but not necessary, parties to
the mechanic's lien enforcement suit.
5 4
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Virginia also considered a case
involving the "blanket lien" concept. As in two of the three "neces-
sary party" cases, the court ruled in favor of the mechanic's lien
claimant. In Blue Ridge Construction Co. v. Stafford Development
Group,55 the supreme court considered whether a general contrac-
tor who built access roads, performed clearing and grading activi-
ties, and installed water and sewer main lines and laterals on cer-
tain property had filed an over-inclusive lien.5 6 The property
consisted of two noncontiguous subparts of a larger parcel from
which certain conveyances had been made prior to the contractor
beginning its work. Much of the contractor's work had been done
on one, but not the other, of the two subparts. The two subparts
had been subdivided into a series of lots on a preliminary site plan
that had been incorporated in the contract documents for the pro-
ject. The site plan, however, had never been recorded and ap-
proved as a plat of subdivision.5
The contractor filed its single lien on the two subparts describ-
ing the property by a metes and bounds description available in
the land records of the courthouse. The owner challenged the lien
on the ground that the contractor should have filed liens on the
separate subparts of the property. The supreme court acknowl-
edged that it had in its recent decisions made clear that a
mechanic's lien will be deemed invalid if it is over-inclusive; that
is, if it extends beyond the property actually improved to include
other property not so benefitted.58 In Blue Ridge, however, the
52.' Id. at 537, 422 S.E.2d at 770 (citing Curtis v. Lee Land Trust, 235 Va. 491, 494, 369
S.E.2d 853, 854 (1988)).
53. Id. at 537, 422 S.E.2d at 770 (citing Lamar Corp. v. City of Richmond, 241 Va. 346,
349-50, 402 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1991)).
54. Air Power, 244 Va. at 538, 422 S.E.2d at 772.
55. 244 Va. 361, 421 S.E.2d 199 (1992).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 362-63, 421 S.E.2d at 200.
58. Id. at 364-65, 421 S.E.2d at 200-01 (citing Woodington Elect. v. Lincoln Say., 238 Va.
623, 385 S.E.2d 872 (1989); Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 572, 379 S.E.2d 323 (1989)).
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court held that the lien in question was not overly inclusive and
that the contractor should be able to rely on the description of the
property as set forth in the land records.5 9 These records reflected
a single parcel from which some portions of the property had been
conveyed to third parties. The contractor had incorporated in its
lien filings the metes and bounds description that was available in
the land records. The supreme court observed that the owner could
have avoided the result of a single len burdening the -entire prop-
erty by simply recording an improved subdivision plat in the land
records of the local court.6
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered three novel
mechanic's lien issues in American Standard Homes Corp. v. Rei-
necke.6 In American Standard, a prefabricated home manufac-
turer entered into a contract to sell homes to a single buyer who
thereafter sold the units to third parties. The manufacturer and
buyer also entered into a second written contract, designated as a
"material order contract," in which certain "extras" were identified
to be provided with each home.62 The material order contract obli-
gated the buyer to pay eighteen percent interest on all debts due
after thirty days and further required the buyer to pay the manu-
facturer twenty-five percent attorneys' fees if collection efforts
were required. Finally the material order contract stipulated that
it was the "complete agreement" between the parties. 3
After the manufacturer had delivered a number of homes under
the general contract and the customized "extras" under the mate-
rial order contract, the buyer ceased doing business. The manufac-
turer fied memoranda of mechanic's Hens against the properties
where the homes had been located and subsequently bills to en-
force the liens. 4 During the proceedings before the commissioner
in chancery, some of the owners of the affected lots objected to the
validity of the liens on the ground that they had not been filed
within the requisite ninety-day period mandated in section 43-4 of
the Code of Virginia.65
59. Blue Ridge, 244 Va. at 365, 421 S.E.2d at 201.
60. Id. at 364-65, 421 S.E.2d at 201.
61. 245 Va. 113, 425 S.E.2d 515 (1993).
62. Id. at 116, 425 S.E.2d at 516.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 117-18, 425 S.E.2d at 516. Section 43-4 of the Code requires a mechanic's lien
claimant to file its lien not later than ninety days after the last day of the month in which
the claimant last furnished materials to the site. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
1993] 693
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The lot owners in American Standard contended that the "ex-
tras" furnished pursuant to the material order contract had been
delivered greater than ninety days before the liens were filed. The
home manufacturer, on the other hand, contended that the ninety-
day period had been tolled by the buyer's subsequent purchase or-
ders for additional materials to replace original materials that had
been lost, damaged, or stolen. 66
The supreme court in American Standard rejected the manufac-
turer's tolling argument. The court reasoned that, upon delivery of
the extras provided in the material order contract, the manufac-
turer had furnished all materials called for in that contract, which
expressly stated that it represented the complete agreement of the
parties. 7 Subsequent purchase orders for replacement materials,
the court concluded, were separate contracts that would not extend
the date for filing the lien as to the material order contracts. 8
The second issue presented in American Standard was whether
the manufacturer could recover interest at the contract rate of
eighteen percent as part of its mechanic's lien claim. The supreme
court ruled that contract interest was so recoverable.6 9 In reaching
this result, the American Standard court first noted that code sec-
tion 6.1-330.53 specifies that a contract rate of interest is recover-
able on a judgment based on the contract.7" The court then noted
that, while the mechanic's lien statutes are silent as to interest, the
forms prescribed in sections 43-5, -8, and -10 of the code71 contain
a blank for the claimant to include the date from which interest is
claimed. The court reasoned that these references to interest in the
forms signaled that the General Assembly intended for interest to
be recoverable on a mechanic's lien claim.7 2 The court then rea-
soned that the General Assembly could have expressly excluded in-
terest as a recoverable item on a mechanic's lien claim or could
66. American Standard, 245 Va. at 119-20, 425 S.E.2d at 517.
67. Id. at 120, 425 S.E.2d 519.
68. Id. The supreme court in American Standard observed that a ruling in favor of the
manufacturer on the tolling argument would permit materialmen to preserve their rights to
file mechanic's liens indefinitely by merely making other sales for replacement materials to
the buyer well beyond the original ninety-day period set out in section 43-4 of the Code of
Virginia. Id. The supreme court rejected the mechanic's lien claimant's argument that a
"good faith" rule should be crafted to limit the claimant's right to file claims under such
circumstances. Id. at 121 n.2, 425 S.E.2d at 519 n.2.
69. American Standard, 245 Va. at 123, 425 S.E.2d at 520.
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.53 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
71. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-5, -8, -10 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
72. American Standard, 245 Va. at 123, 425 S.E.2d at 520.
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have limited such recovery to the legal rate of interest had either
alternative been its intent. The court, therefore, concluded that
the General Assembly's failure to impose any limitations on inter-
est demonstrated a legislative intent that interest at the contract
rate, as permitted in code section 6.1-330.53 was recoverable as
part of a mechanic's lien claim.7 3
The American Standard court finally considered whether the
mechanic's lien claimant could recover contractually permitted at-
torneys' fees in the mechanic's lien suit. In deciding it could not,7 4
the court contrasted the mention of interest in the statutory forms
to the absence of any reference to attorneys' fees anywhere in the
mechanic's lien statutes. This omission, the court reasoned,
demonstrated a legislative intent that contractual attorneys' fees
not be recoverable as part of the lien claim.75
The final recent case dealing with a mechanic's lien issue de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Virginia is Vansant and Gusler,
Inc. v. Washington.8 In Vansant, the court addressed whether
code section 43-13 creates a private right of action for damages in
favor of subcontractors who are not paid by their general contrac-
tor.7 7 Section 43-13, a criminal statute, treats a contractor's diver-
sion of funds due its subcontractors to other uses with the intent
to defraud as larceny. The statute also imposes criminal liability
on the contractor's officers, directors, and employees in such
circumstances.7 8
In Vansant, the subcontractor, a consulting engineering firm,
sued both the general contractor, an architectural firm, and the ar-
chitectural firm's officers and directors. The architectural firm suf-
fered a default judgment on the subcontractor's contract claim.
The subcontractor continued its suit against the architectural
firm's officers and directors, alleging that section 43-13 not only
imposed criminal liability on them, but also provided the subcon-
tractor a private cause of action against them individually to re-
cover the funds not paid by the contractor.7 9
73. Id. at 122-23, 425 S.E.2d at 519-20.
74. Id. at 123-24, 425 S.E.2d at 520-21.
75. Id. The American Standard court did acknowledge that the chancery court as part of
its equity proceedings would have the authority to enter a separate money judgment for
attorneys' fees as a claim sounding in contract. Id. at 124, 425 S.E.2d at 520.
76. 429 S.E.2d 31 (1993).
77. Id. at 32.
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-13 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
79. Vansant, 429 S.E.2d at 32.
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The supreme court rejected the subcontractor's argument that
section 43-13 provided it a private cause of action against the indi-
vidual defendants. The court noted that the statute is "purely a
criminal statute" which does not expressly provide any civil cause
of action. Moreover, the court observed that a private cause of ac-
tion could not be implied because the statute expressly provided
for a remedy (the criminal sanction) and, absent language to the
contrary, that remedy must be deemed exclusive.s0
The Vansant court rejected the subcontractor's additional inge-
nious argument that code section 8.01-221 provided express recog-
nition of the private cause of action when read in conjunction with
section 43-13.81 Section 8.01-221 states in pertinent part that:
Any person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from
the offender such damages as he may sustain by reason of the viola-
tion, even though a penalty or forfeiture for such violation be
thereby imposed, unless such penalty or forfeiture be expressly men-
tioned to be in lieu of such damages.8 2
The supreme court relied upon its prior decisions construing sec-
tion 8.01-221 to reject the subcontractor's argument. The court ob-
served that for decades the recognized purpose of section 8.01-221
has been to prevent a party from avoiding a civil obligation on the
basis of having paid a parallel criminal penalty. 3
The court further observed that there was no cause of action es-
tablished by statute or common law that would permit the subcon-
tractor to sue the officers and directors of the contractor individu-
ally to recover funds not paid to the subcontractor during the
course of the construction.84 Accordingly, the court dismissed the
subcontractor's appeal.8 5
80. Id. at 33 (citing Kayhoe Constr. Co. v. United Va. Bank, 220 Va. 285, 289, 257 S.E.2d
837, 839 (1979), and School Bd. v. Giannoutsos, 238 Va. 144, 147, 380 S.E.2d 647, 649
(1989)).
81. Id.
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-221 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
83. Vansant, 429 S.E.2d at 33. In Connelly v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Va. 51, 40 S.E.
618 (1902), the supreme court first rejected the idea that section 8.01-221's predecessor cre-
ated a new cause of action. In Connelly the supreme court held that the predecessor stat-
ute's purpose was merely to prevent a person who was subjected to criminal sanction from
contending that the criminal sanction was an exclusive remedy, thereby barring subsequent
civil suit to recover damages. Connelly, 100 Va. at 62-63, 40 S.E. at 622.




A recent circuit court case regarding mechanic's liens dealt with
the tolling effect bankruptcy has on the requirement to file an en-
forcement suit within six months of the filing of the lien."8 In
United Sprinkler Co. v. HCP 505 Ltd., Inc.,"7 a sprinkler trade
contractor filed a memorandum of mechanic's lien against the
property of an owner that had been forced into bankruptcy. Be-
cause of the bankruptcy stay, the contractor did not file its en-
forcement suit within six months after filing its memorandum of
lien."8
During the bankruptcy proceedings, the court granted the con-
struction lender relief from the stay to institute foreclosure pro-
ceedings against the liened property. The lender thereafter pur-
chased the foreclosed property and assigned the bid to HCP 505.
Several months later, the contractor, United Sprinkler, brought its
enforcement suit against the property. HCP demurred on the
ground that United Sprinkler did not file the suit within six
months as required by code section 43-17.89
The circuit court rejected the demurrer, observing that section
108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code9" and section 8.01-229 of the Code
of Virginia91 jointly tolled the six-month time period imposed in
section 43-17.92 The court rejected HCP's argument that the six-
month time period, even if tolled during the bankruptcy proceed-
ings, began to run when the bankruptcy court granted the lender
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17 (Repl. Vol. 1990) ("No suit to enforce [a mechanic's lien] shall
be brought after six months from the time when the memorandum of lien was recorded.").
87. 27 Va. Cir. 135 (Fairfax County 1992).
88. Id. at 135-36.
89. Id. at 136.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1978). Section 108(c) states in pertinent part:
[I]f applicable nonbankruptcy law.. . fixes a period for commencing... a civil ac-
tion in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor.., and
such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such
period does not expire until the later of:
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on
or after the commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after notice of the termina-
tion or expiration of the stay under section 362... with respect to such claim.
Id.
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229 (Repl. Vol. 1992). Section 8.01-229 states in pertinent part:
When the filing of an action is obstructed by a defendant's (i) filing a petition in
bankruptcy or filing a petition for an extension or arrangement under the United
States Bankruptcy Act or (ii) using any other direct or indirect means to obstruct the
filing of an action, then the time that such obstruction has continued shall not be
counted as any part of the period within which the action must be brought. ...
Id.
92. United Sprinkler, 27 Va. Cir. at 136-37.
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relief from the stay and had thus expired when United Sprinkler
filed its enforcement suit over six months later.9 3 Rather, the court
concluded that the relief from the stay did not start the six-month
period running because the bankruptcy court only lifted the stay
as to the construction lender, and not the other creditors of the
bankrupt debtor.9 4 As such, the property remained property of the
bankruptcy estate and subject to the stay until the lender con-
cluded foreclosure less than five months before United Sprinkler
initiated its enforcement action. The court, therefore, concluded
that the enforcement suit had been timely filed.9 5
B. Contract Disputes Between Contractors and Subcontractors
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently decided an important
case dealing with the evidentiary requirements of lost profit and
"extra" claims that will affect how such damage claims are proved
in the future. In TechDyn Systems Corp. v. Wittaker Corp.,"6 a
general contractor sued its subcontractor for delay damages and
lost profits from a software program contract with the United
States Air Force. 7 The subcontractor counterclaimed for work per-
formed outside the scope of the original contract.
A jury awarded the general contractor over one million dollars
on its claims, and the subcontractor over $500,000 on its counter-
claim. The trial court set aside the verdict in favor of the general
contractor and entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. 8
On appeal, the general contractor contended that the trial court
erred in setting aside the jury verdict on the delay claim.99 The
subcontractor, in contrast, contended that the general contractor
was not entitled to delay damages because delay on the project was
93. Id. at 137.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 137-38. On the related issue of timely filing of a payment bond claim under the
Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (1978), see United States ex rel. American Sheet Metal
Corp. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 807 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Va. 1992) (failure to
give statutory ninety-day notice to contractor and surety barred subcontractor's payment
bond claim).
96. 245 Va. 291, 427 S.E.2d 334 (1993).
97. Id. at 293-94, 427 S.E.2d at 336. The TechDyn case is not technically a construction
case as the contract in question dealt with creation of a computer software package and not
a structure or building. The legal issues in the case, however, are directly applicable to the
construction context and the case will certainly have impact in future construction law
cases.
98. Id. at 293, 427 S.E.2d at 336.
99. Id. at 296, 427 S.E.2d at 337.
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caused by numerous factors, some of which had nothing to do with
the subcontractor's actions. The subcontractor asserted that the
delay claim was defective because the general contractor had not
apportioned the damages specifically caused by the
subcontractor. 0°
The supreme court in TechDyn initially conceded that where a
plaintiff's damages result from multiple causes, some of which are
not attributable to the defendant, the plaintiff must prove with a
"reasonable degree of certainty" the portion of damages actually
caused by the defendant in order to recover."' 1 The court con-
cluded that the general contractor had presented sufficient evi-
dence of the delay damages directly attributable to the subcontrac-
tor's actions on the project. The fact that the subcontractor
presented counter-evidence to suggest that the delay had other
causes presented a jury issue, which the jury resolved in favor of
the contractor. Based on this analysis, the supreme court over-
turned the trial court's ruling which set aside the jury verdict on
the delay damage claim.102
In TechDyn, the supreme court also considered whether the trial
court correctly struck the general contractor's lost profit claim.10 3
The general contractor contended at trial that the subcontractor's
delays prevented the contractor from releasing its employees from
proposals to obtain new business. In analyzing the trial record, the
supreme court observed that the general contractor did not pro-
duce evidence at trial to show that it would have been successful in
obtaining new business had the employees in question been availa-
ble to prepare proposals or even that these employees had a proven
track record in attracting new business in the past.104 Given this
lack of evidence, the supreme court characterized the general con-
tractor's lost profit claim as "remote, speculative, and uncertain,
and therefore, not recoverable."' 10 5
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Carr v. Citizens Bank & Trust, 228 Va. 644, 325 S.E.2d 86 (1985); Cooper
v. Whiting Oil Co., 226 Va. 491, 311 S.E.2d 757 (1984); Sachs v. Hoffman, 224 Va. 545, 299
S.E.2d 694 (1983); and Pebble Bldg. Co. v. G.J. Hopkins, Inc. 223 Va. 188, 288 S.E.2d 437
(1982)).
102. Tech Dyn, 245 Va. at 298, 427 S.E.2d at 338-39.
103. Id. at 298, 427 S.E. 2d at 339.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 298-99, 427 S.E.2d at 339 (relying on Murray v. Hadid, 238 Va. 722, 385 S.E.2d
898 (1989); ADC Fairways Corp. v. Johnmark Constr., Inc., 231 Va. 312, 243 S.E.2d 90
(1986)); and Boggs v. Duncan, 202 Va. 877, 121 S.E.2d 359 (1961).
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Finally, the supreme court considered the merits of the subcon-
tractor's counterclaim. The jury awarded the subcontractor com-
pensation for extra work it was allegedly required to perform be-
yond the original contractual scope of work.108 At trial, the
subcontractor submitted a one-page trial exhibit summarizing the
hours worked by his employees on the extra work. The data used
to produce the trial exhibit was assembled by subcontractor em-
ployees who did not testify at trial. Those employees, who did tes-
tify as to the extra claim, lacked personal knowledge of the factual
substance of the claim. The general contractor objected to the evi-
dence at trial on hearsay grounds.0 7
The supreme court agreed with the general contractor and re-
versed the jury verdict in favor of the subcontractor's counter-
claim. The court observed that the trial testimony in support of
the claim relied on the "veracity and competency" of someone who
did not testify, and thus, was inadmissible hearsay. 0 8
Two recent cases have considered the validity of an owner's ter-
mination of a construction contract. In W. C. English, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia Department of Transportation,°9 the Court of Appeals of
Virginia considered whether the owner could terminate a contract
when, without fault of either the contractor or the owner, it be-
comes obvious that the amount of work and time required to com-
plete the contract would greatly exceed that which the parties orig-
inally contemplated when the contract was executed.""
In W.C. English, the Virginia Department of Transportation
(VDOT) terminated the contract when eight-one percent of the
dollar value of the contract had been expended, but only forty-
seven percent of the work completed. VDOT terminated the con-
tract pursuant to a provision allowing termination for conditions
beyond VDOT's control that prevented it from continuing."
The contractor argued that VDOT's lack of funding necessary to
complete the contract was not a condition beyond VDOT's control.
The contractor further contended that the termination clause of
106. Id. at 299-300, 427 S.E.2d at 339-40.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 299-300, 427 S.E.2d at 340 (quoting Williams v. Morris, 200 Va. 413, 416-17,
105 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1958); and citing Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 463, 237 S.E.2d
779 (1977), and Lee v. Artis, 295 Va. 343, 136 S.E.2d 868 (1964)).
109. 14 Va. App. 951, 420 S.E.2d 252 (1992).




the contract was similar to the doctrine of impossibility of per-
formance. Because additional funding could have been made avail-
able for the project, it was not impossible for VDOT to continue
with the contract.112
The court of appeals in W.C. English rejected the view that the
termination clause should be interpreted as an impossibility of
performance provision. The court concluded that the clause per-
mitted termination if a condition existed that merely hindered or
forestalled continuation of the contract. The court also reasoned
that the contractor's overruns, not the unavailability of funding,
qualified as a condition beyond VDOT's control." 3 If VDOT were
not allowed to terminate the contract due to the substantial cost
overruns encountered, the Commonwealth's treasury would be at
the mercy of highway contractors' overruns, a condition which the
contract was drafted to avoid. Therefore, the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's holding that VDOT had properly termi-
nated the contract.. 4
In Spotsylvania County School Board v. Seaboard Surety
Co.," 5 the contract in question granted the school board the right
to terminate the contract if the contractor was guilty of a "sub-
stantial violation" of a provision of the contract documents." 6 Af-
ter the school board terminated the contract and the surety agreed
to perform all work not completed by the contractor, the surety
employed the contractor as its subcontractor to complete the pro-
ject. Once again, the school board gave notice that it was terminat-
ing the contract. The school board then engaged another contrac-
tor and the project was completed at almost two times the original
contract amount."
7
The school board in Spotsylvania County then brought suit
against the surety for breach of the performance bond, and the
contractor brought suit against the school board seeking damages
for breach of contract. The school board filed a counterclaim seek-
ing damages resulting from the contractor's alleged breach. The
112. Id. at 954, 420 S.E.2d at 254.
113. Id. at 954-55, 420 S.E.2d at 254.
114. Id. at 955, 420 S.E.2d at 255. The trial court in W.C. English failed to address
whether VDOT was entitled to liquidated damages from the contractor; therefore, the court
of appeals reversed and remanded the decision for the trial court to hear evidence on that
issue.
115. 243 Va. 202, 415 S.E.2d 120 (1992).
116. Id. at 205, 415 S.E.2d at 122.
117. Id.
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jury held that the school board was not justified in terminating the
contract and the trial court awarded damages in the amount of
$146,430. l l 8
On appeal, the supreme court rejected the school board's argu-
ment that serious violations of the BOCA Code,119 as admitted by
the contractor's witnesses, established as a matter of law that the
contractor was guilty of a material breach of the contract. The
court reasoned that these admissions could not be considered alone
or in the abstract in determining the breach of contract issue, but
rather had to be considered by the jury along with the abundant
evidence of contractual interference by the school board's project
architect.120
The supreme court nonetheless reversed and remanded the case
because, while "substantial violation" was the standard agreed
upon in the contract, a jury instruction required the school board
to prove a "material or substantial breach of contract" in order to
succeed. 21 A second jury instruction defined a material or substan-
tial breach of contract as the failure to do something which is so
important and central to the contract that the breach defeats the
purpose of the contract.122 The court reasoned that the instruc-
tions were improper because they increased the burden imposed
upon the school board above the "substantial violation" standard
already agreed upon by the parties in the contract.'23
The court then addressed two potential evidentiary issues that
may arise on remand. First, the court held that the trial court
erred in admitting evidence of pre-contract discussions and corre-
spondence between the parties.' The supreme court observed
that the contract not only was unambiguous, but it also contained
a merger clause. Thus, no evidence of pre-contract discussions and
correspondence should be admitted at retrial. 25
118. Id. at 206, 415 S.E.2d at 122. The Spotsylvania County trial consisted of three
phases: liability, damages, and remaining issues.
119. BOCA is an acronym for the Building Officials and Code Administration. The parties
agreed that "the BOCA Code was incorporated by reference in Sherman's contract with the
School Board." Id. at 207, n.1, 415 S.E.2d 123 n.1.
120. Id. at 209, 415 S.E.2d at 124.
121. Id. at 212, 415 S.E.2d at 126.
122. Id. at 212, 415 S.E.2d at 125-26.
123. Id.




Second, the supreme court held that evidence that the school
building was overdesigned was inadmissible. 126 The contractor ar-
gued that, due to overdesign, the contractor's failure to comply
with each safety feature did not make its work defective nor make
the building unsafe. The supreme court, however, reasoned that it
is the contract, not the contractor, which controls what design fea-
tures are necessary. 127 Evidence of overdesign was thus inadmissi-
ble at retrial.'
The supreme court also addressed two evidentiary issues that
would arise in the damage phase of the retrial. The court held that
the trial court had correctly excluded the school board's evidence
of the cost of repairing items defectively constructed by the con-
tractor.129 The court reasoned that the provisions in the contract
holding the contractor liable for the cost of correcting its defective
work were not intended to apply in the event that the school board
was in breach. Because the jury determined that the school board
was in breach, it was proper to exclude the school board's offset
damage evidence.3 0 If, upon retrial, the jury verdict was again in
favor of the contractor, the school board would again be denied
the right to present evidence on its costs of repair."'-
The supreme court also upheld a contractual provision that lim-
ited the contractor's damages in the event of a termination without
cause. 3 2 The contractor argued that, in light of the school board's
breach, the limitation on the contractor's damages did not apply. 33
The court disagreed noting that the clause was designed for this
very situation. Therefore, if the retrial demonstrated that the con-
tract termination was without cause, the contractor's presentation
of damage evidence would again be limited to the work done
before termination, plus profit.13 4
126. Id. at 213, 415 S.E.2d at 126.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 215, 415 S.E.2d at 127-28.
130. Id. (relying on Hurley v. Bennett, 163 Va. 241, 253, 176 S.E. 171, 175 (1934), and
distinguishing Kirk Reid Co. v. Fine, 205 Va. 778, 788-89, 139 S.E.2d 829, 836-37 (1965) and
Erlich v. Hendrick Constr. Co., 217 Va. 108, 114-15, 225 S.E.2d 665, 669-70 (1976)).
131. Spotsylvania County, 243 Va. at 215, 415 S.E.2d at 128.
132. Id. at 216-17, 415 S.E.2d at 128-29. The contract in Spotsylvania County provided
that, in the event of a termination without cause, the contractor was entitled to payment for
work executed plus profit and any loss on materials, but not for profit on materials or labor
not furnished.
133. Id. at 217, 415 S.E.2d at 129.
134. Id.
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On a procedural error, the supreme court dismissed the school
board's appeal of the trial court's sustaining the surety's demurrer
to the school board's bad faith claim. After the jury verdict in
favor of the contractor, the trial court granted summary judgment
for the surety on "all claims" asserted against the surety. Because
the school board had failed to object in the trial court to the
awarding of summary judgment on "all claims." The supreme
court, therefore, dismissed the school board's appeal on the demur-
rer because the school board's failure to object to the summary
judgment order or to assign error as to that order on appeal. 135
Finally, the supreme court held that after the school board's non-
suit of the indemnification claim following the surety's demurrer,
and motion for summary judgment on the indemnification claim
was denied, questions raised by the demurrer and motion were
mooted and could not be raised by the surety on appeal. L3 6
In Brown v. State Board for Contractors,3 7 the Williamsburg
circuit court considered when a claim against the Contractors
Transaction Recovery Fund (the fund) accrued. The fund allows
certain persons to make claims and obtain up to $10,000 for unsat-
isfied judgments obtained against contractors for improper or dis-
honest conduct."8" The plaintiffs filed suit against their contractor
in May 1987 and obtained a judgment in May 1988. In the interim,
however, the General Assembly passed an amendment requiring
that the dollar amount of the underlying contract be within the
contractor's authorized limits before a party could make a claim
against the fund.139
135. Id. at 219, 415 S.E.2d at 130.
136. Id. at 220, 415 S.E.2d at 130.
137. 27 Va. Cir. 500 (Williamsburg City 1989). Although the court rendered the Brown
decision in 1989, it was not published until 1993.
138. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-1118 to -1127 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
139. Prior to the amendment, the Code of Virginia section 54-145.3:3 provided:
Recovery from fund generally. - Whenever any person is awarded a final judgment
in a Court... against any individual... for improper or dishonest conduct and
such conduct occurred during a period when such individual ... was a regulant and
occurred in connection with a transaction involving contracting, as defined in § 54-
113, the judgment creditor may file a claim in the court awarding the judgment to
obtain an Order directing payment from the fund of the amount unpaid upon the
judgment subject to the following conditions. ...
The 1987 amendment narrowed Virginia Code § 54.1-145.3:3 as follows:
Recovery from fund generally. - Whenever any person is awarded a judgment in a
Court against any individual.., for improper or dishonest conduct and such con-
duct occurred (e) during a period when such individual . . . was a regulant con-
tracting within its license category (Class A or Class B) ....
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The plaintiffs argued that their claim 'accrued at the time the
contractor abandoned the job. Therefore, even though the amount
of their contract exceeded the contractor's authorized limits, their
claim would not be barred by the subsequent statutory amend-
ment.140 The defendant State Board for Contractors, however, ar-
gued that the plaintiff's claim against the fund did not arise at the
same time as their claim against the contractor. The fund had an
obligation to make payment, but not until the plaintiffs had be-
come judgment creditors.1 41 The court agreed with the defendant,
holding that the plaintiffs' claim against the fund did not accrue
until the judgment for improper conduct was entered against the
contractor. Thus, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover from
the fund.142
In Halco Engineering, Inc. v. Commonwealth,43 the Fairfax cir-
cuit court considered a number of defenses asserted by the Com-
monwealth to preclude a contractor from recovering damages for a
delay allegedly caused by the Commonwealth's acts and omissions.
First, the Commonwealth contended that the contract expressly
provided, as the contractor's exclusive remedy for delay, an exten-
sion of time and relief from the imposition of liquidated dam-
ages.1 44 The provision in question stated that the contractor would
be obligated to pay liquidated damages if it did not complete the
work within the contract time, unless the contractor was delayed
because of an "act or neglect" of the owner or engineer, or by
changes in the work. In that situation the time for completion
would be reasonably extended and the contractor would not be
charged with "liquidated or actual damages" during the extended
period.1 45
Citing United States Supreme Court authority, 46 the Common-
wealth argued that the extension of time provision provided the
contractor's only remedy and barred any claim for monetary dam-
In 1990, Code of Virginia section 54.1-145.3:3 (now section 54.1-1120) was again amended
by the deletion of the phrase "contracting within its license category (Class A or Class B)"
following "regulant."
140. Brown, 27 Va. Cir. at 502.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 503.
143. 27 Va. Cir. 111 (Fairfax County 1992).
144. Id. at 113.
145. Id. at 112-13.
146. Id. at 112. The Commonwealth relied on the case of United States v. Rice, 317 U.S.
61 (1942).
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ages. The circuit court rejected the Commonwealth's argument, ob-
serving that the authority cited had been "nullified" by the federal
courts and not followed by other state courts. 47 The court, there-
fore, held that time extension was not the contractor's only remedy
for delay caused by the owner. The contractor was free to pursue
other remedies at law.148
In Halco, the Commonwealth also argued that the contractor
waived its delay damages claim by accepting two change orders ex-
tending the completion time and providing additional compensa-
tion. 1 49 The Commonwealth contended that the contractor's ac-
ceptance of the change orders represented an accord and
satisfaction and thus barred an additional monetary claim. The
court concluded that waiver and accord and satisfaction were fac-
tual issues to be resolved at trial. While some delays preceded the
change orders, others were unrelated and thus evidence on the
question was required.1 0 Lastly, the court agreed with the Com-
monwealth's position that the contractor could not recover pre-
judgment interest against the Commonwealth absent an express
contractual right.151
In a memorandum opinion, DNM, Inc. v. S.H. Clark & Sons
Roofing, Inc., 52 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether
the trial court wrongly dismissed an owner's claim against a con-
tractor on the ground that there was no contractual privity. The
contractor entered into an agreement with the owner's construc-
tion manager, rather than the owner. Contractual privity existed
only if an agency relationship between the owner and its construc-
tion manager could be found.1
5 3
147. Halco, 27 Va. Cir. at 113. The circuit court in Halco did not cite any federal author-
ity that had "nullified" the Rice doctrine. The court did cite two cases from other states
which had held that the remedies otherwise available to contracting parties for breach of the
contract would not be limited by the remedies set out in the contract, unless there was clear
evidence that the parties intended for the contractual remedies to be exclusive. Id. at 114
(citing Nave v. Powell, 96 N.E. 295 (Ind. App. 1911), and J.L. White Furnace Co. v. C.W.
Miller Transfer Co., 115 N.Y.S. 625 (1909)).
148. Halco, 27 Va. Cir. at 114.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 114-15 (citing Highway Comm'r v. Parsonage Trustees, 220 Va. 402, 258 S.E.2d
503 (1979), and City of Lynchburg v. County of Amherst, 115 Va. 600, 80 S.E. 117 (1913)).
152. No. 91123, 1992 Va. LEXIS 102 (Apr. 17, 1992). The supreme court specified at the
outset of its opinion in DNM, Inc. that the opinion would not be published and is not to be
cited or relied upon as precedent in future cases.
153. Id. at *3.
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Focusing on the written contract to determine if an agency. rela-
tion existed, the court observed that some provisions granted the
owner control over the construction manager's activities. The con-
tract authorized the owner's on-site representative to control cer-
tain details and methods of operation including approval of the
budget and any change orders recommended by the construction
manager.154 Other provisions of the contract also suggested that an
agency relationship, such as the construction manager's agreement
to complete the project in a "manner consistent with the interest
of the Owner" and its acknowledgement that a relationship of
"trust and confidence" existed between the parties evidenced an
agency relationship.155 Other contract provisions, however, sug-
gested that the construction manager was an independent contrac-
tor retaining control over its own methods and details of work. 156
Because of this ambiguity in the contract, the court affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the owner failed to prove an agency rela-
tionship. Absent such agency the owner lacked privity with the
contractor and therefore had no legal basis to pursue a breach of
contract action against the contractor.
157
In an unpublished opinion, Perry Engineering Co., Inc. v. AT&T
Communications, Inc.,5 8 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia considered whether the contractor's
failure to timely notify the owner of an contract price increase ter-
minated its right to payment under the contract.1 59 The contractor
and the owner contracted for the underground installation of sev-
enty-three miles of fiber optic cable.6 0 A unit price was set for re-
moving considerable rock expected to be encountered during the
cable installation. 6' The contract required the contractor to sub-
mit a written proposal regarding changes affecting the contract
price within ten days of receipt of the request for a change. 6 2
During construction, the owner considerably changed the depth
of trenching, thereby greatly reducing the rock which had to be
removed. The reduction in work allegedly eliminated the contrac-
154. Id. at *5.
155. Id. at *4.
156. Id. at *5.
157. Id.
158. No. 90-0153-H, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12332 (W.D. Va. July 31, 1992).
159. Id. at *1-2.
160. Id. at *3.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *11-12.
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tor's ability to recover certain expenses it incurred on the pro-
ject.' The contractor failed to alert the owner of these un-
reimbursed expenses during the course of construction but
submitted a change order ten months after the project's comple-
tion.' The contractor argued that it should not be held to the
ten-day notice requirement because the owner's repeated requests
to modify the work would not normally affect the contract price.16 5
The court agreed, but held that when the cumulative effect of the
owner's requests produces a loss to the contractor exceeding ten
percent of the anticipated billings, the contractor must alert the
owner of the change in the contract price within ten days. 6 Be-
cause the contractor failed to do so, it had no right to payment. 67
The contractor also argued that the owner waived the require-
ment that the contractor submit a written proposal for project
changes by orally submitting its modifications.6 8 The court, how-
ever, observed that the contract required the contractor to notify
the owner when any requested change in the work would result in
a price change, and that the owner's oral directives, absent such
notice, could not constitute waiver of the written notice provision.
Moreover, the court observed that the contractor timely submitted
twenty-one written change orders.6 9 Given this clear course of
dealing, the court found no basis for the contractor's waiver
claim. 70
The court also rejected the contractor's argument that it should
be allowed to recover under quantum meruit.'7 ' Because the con-
tract was valid and unambiguous, the court held quantum meruit
was not available. 7 2 Therefore, the court granted the owner's mo-
163. Id. at *5.
164. Id. at *6.
165. Id. at *11-12.
166. Id. at *12.
167. Id. at *12-13.
168. Id. at *18-19.
169. Id. at *19.
170. Id. at *19-20. The Perry Engineering court noted there must be "'clear and unmis-
takable evidence' of waiver of contractual terms requiring written approval and timely no-
tice of claims for extra work." Id. at *19 (citing Service Steel Erectors Co. v. SCE, Inc., 573
F. Supp. 177, 180 (W.D. Va. 1983)).
171. Perry Engineering at *20-21.
172. Id. at *20-21 (citing Hendrickson v. Meredith, 161 Va. 193, 170 S.E.2d 602 (1933),
and Marine Development v. Rodak, 225 Va. 137, 300 S.E.2d 763 (1983)).
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tion for summary judgment on the contractor's claims for unbil-
lable costs under the contract.17
In Rader v. Commonwealth,174 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered the appeal of a contractor convicted of construction
fraud in violation of section 18.2-200.1 of the Code.17 5 The contrac-
tor argued that the code section did not apply because the $9,600
payment from the homeowner was not an advance but payment for
completed work. The court disagreed as the contractor received
the payment conditioned on completing the project that same day.
Further, the contractor failed to order additional building materi-
als, apply for the necessary building permits, or communicate de-
lays to the homeowners, evidencing his intent to never complete
the project."7 6
The court also held that evidence of the contractor's building
code violations were admissible because the violations were rele-
vant to the contractor's intent not to abide by building codes and
restrictions as prescribed by the contract.1 Therefore, the court of
appeals upheld the contractor's conviction for construction
fraud.178
In United States ex rel. Whitaker's Inc. v. C.B.C. Enterprises,
Inc.,179 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia considered the application of Virginia's commercial code
to a dispute between a general contractor and a materialman. The
materialman, Whitaker's Inc. of Sumter, contracted to supply cabi-
nets to the contractor, C.B.C Enterprises. 180 According to the con-
173. Perry Engineering at *21.
174. 15 Va. App. 325, 423 S.E.2d 207 (1992).
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-200.1 (Repl. Vol. 1988). Section 18.2-200.1 provides:
If any person obtain from another an advance of money, merchandise or other thing
of value, with fraudulent intent, upon a promise to perform construction, removal,
repair or improvement of any building or structure permanently annexed to real
property... and fail or refuse to perform such promise, and also fail to substantially
make good such advance, he shall be deemed guilty of the larceny of such money,
merchandise or other thing if he fails to return such advance within fifteen days of a
request to do so sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to his last known
address or to the address listed in the contract.
Id.
176. Rader, 15 Va. App. at 329-30, 423 S.E.2d at 211.
177. Id. at 332, 423 S.E.2d at 212.
178. Id.
179. No. 2:92cv477, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6207 (E.D. Va. Apr. 30, 1993).
180. Id. at *1.
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tract, Whitaker's agreed to supply the cabinets in batches of fif-
teen units each."'1
However, the first shipment of cabinets failed to meet specifica-
tions and the owner rejected them. C.B.C. nevertheless installed
the cabinets based on Whitaker's assurances that the cabinets
would be brought into compliance with the specifications.1 8 2 Whit-
aker's failed to cure the problem and C.B.C. subsequently gave no-
tice of termination.183 C.B.C. then contracted with another cabinet
company and directed Whitaker's to remove the nonconforming
cabinets. When Whitaker's did not respond, C.B.C. removed and
destroyed the cabinets."8
The district court ruled that C.B.C.'s decision to install the non-
conforming cabinets constituted acceptance under Virginia's com-
mercial code. 8 5 C.B.C.'s knowing acceptance of the nonconforming
cabinets precluded it from revoking the acceptance and C.B.C. was
required to compensate Whitaker's for the first shipment.8 6 The
court also found that Whitaker's breached its obligations under the
commercial code to cure the defects in the accepted cabinets, giv-
ing rise to C.B.C.'s right to recover from Whitaker's the additional
costs in procuring the additional cabinets from another supplier.18 7
C. Disputes Arising Under the Virginia Public Procurement Act
The Virginia courts have recently decided a number of cases re-
quiring interpretation of the Virginia Public Procurement Act,
("the Procurement Act"). e' In W. M. Schlosser Co., Inc. v. Board.
of Supervisors of Fairfax Co.,' 89 the Supreme Court of Virginia de-
cided whether, under the provisions of the Procurement Act, a des-
ignee of a county executive was a "disinterested person" qualified
181. Id. at *4.
182. Id. at *6.
183. Id. at *6-7.
184. Id. at *7.
185. Id. at *12 (citing V& CODE ANN. § 8.2-606(1)(c) (Repl. Vol. 1991)).
186. C.B.C. at *13 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-607(2) (Repl. VoL 1991)). The court also
observed that, even if C.B.C. had possessed the right to reject the nonconforming cabinets
after installing them, it did not have the right under the U.C.C. to discard the cabinets after
removal. C.B.C., the court observed, had the obligation to either store the goods, return
them to the seller, or resell them. The court noted that C.B.C. did not attempt to salvage
the goods as was required by the U.C.C.; rather C.B.C.'s decision to discard the cabinets
rendered them valueless. Id. at *14 n.6 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-604 (Repl. VoL 1991)).
187. C.B.C. at *16 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-714 (Repl. VoL 1991)).
188. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35 to -80 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
189. 245 Va. 451, 428 S.E.2d 919 (1993).
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to decide contractual disputes involving the county.190  In
Schlosser, the contractor entered an agreement with the county to
renovate the courthouse. The contract permitted the county execu-
tive or his designee to hear the contractor's appeal of any claim
submitted to the county. When alleged design defects in the plans
and specifications disrupted and suspended the completion of the
contract, the contractor submitted a written claim to the county
for additional costs and damages in accordance with the adminis-
trative appeal process established in the contract.19 ' Both the
county's director of public works and the acting county executive's
designee successively denied the claim.'92 The contractor then
sought judicial review of the designee's decision, but the trial court
sustained the county's demurrer and special plea in bar on the
ground that the contract's administrative procedures had been
satisfied.9 3
On appeal, the contractor argued the county violated the Pro-
curement Act's requirement that a "disinterested person or panel"
preside over the administrative hearings, because the county ap-
pointed one of its own employees to serve as the hearing officer to
decide the claim.194 The supreme court noted that- the Procure-
ment Act uniquely balanced many competing interests and con-
ferred certain rights and obligations upon citizens, non-governmen-
tal contractors, and governmental entities.' 9 The supreme court
reasoned that, even though the contractor executed an agreement
that permitted the county executive or his designee to preside over
the contractor's administrative appeal, the contract could not elim-
190. Id. at 452, 428 S.E.2d at 919 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 11-71(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989)).
Section 11-71A provides:
A public body may establish an administrative procedure for hearing protests of a
decision to award or an award, appeals from refusals to allow withdrawal of bids,
appeals from disqualifications and determinations of nonresponsibility, and appeals
from decisions on disputes arising during the performance of a contract, or any of
these. Such administrative procedure shall provide for a hearing before a disinter-
ested person or panel, the opportunity to present pertinent information and the issu-
ance of a written decision containing findings of fact. The findings of fact shall be
final and conclusive and shall not be set aside unless the same are fraudulent or arbi-
trary or capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith. No determination on
an issue of law shall be final if appropriate legal action is instituted in a timely
manner.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
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inate the contractor's right to a hearing before a disinterested per-
son as required under the Procurement Act.'
The court then held that an employee of a governmental entity
against whom a claim has been filed cannot be a disinterested per-
son under the provisions of section 11-71A. 197 The court observed
that this particular designee had been appointed by the acting
county executive who served at the pleasure of the board of super-
visors, the entity against whom the contractor's claim had been
made. Moreover, the designee was the county's director of general
services initially involved in the scope of the renovation project,
even though he had no prior knowledge of the contractor's claim. 198
Under these circumstances, the court reasoned that the contractor
had been denied the disinterested person called for in section 11-
71(A). 199
Several recent cases have addressed another provision of the
Procurement Act. In W.M. Schlosser Co., Inc. v. Fairfax County
Redevelopment and Housing Authority,200 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether code
section 11-70,201 which provides that a contractor does not necessa-
rily have to utilize administrative review procedures prior to filing
196. Id. Relying upon Hladys v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 145, 366 S.E.2d 98 (1988), the
county argued that the contractor's rights were not abridged because there was no showing
of bias or improper conduct on the part of the hearing officer. The Schlosser court, however,
distinguished Hladys because it dealt with minimum requirements of due process, while the
case at hand concerned the express statutory requirement that the hearing be before a dis-
interested person. Schlosser, 245 Va. at 457, 428 S.E.2d at 922-33.
197. Schlosser, 428 S.E.2d at 922.
198. Id.
199. Id. In an earlier unpublished decision, Gust K. Newberg Construction Co. v. County
of Falrfax, Nos. 91-1674, 91-1798, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18478 (4th Cir. Aug. 7, 1992), the
Fourth Circuit also addressed the disinterested person provisions of the Procurement Act.
While specifically refraining from ruling on whether any of the hearing officers in the case
did not meet the disinterested person requirement, the court suggested that future contro-
versies could be best avoided by a panel of hearing officers who (1) are not employees of the
county, (2) are completely independent of the parties, and (3) are knowledgeable of the
construction business. Newberg Construction, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18478 at *8.
200. 975 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1992).
201. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-70 (Repl. Vol. 1989). Section 11-70 provides in pertinent part:
E. A contractor may bring an action involving a contract dispute with a public body
in the appropriate circuit court.
F. A bidder, offeror or contractor need not utilize administrative procedures meet-
ing the standards of § 11-71 of this Code, if available, but if those procedures are
invoked by the bidder, offeror or contractor, the procedures shall be exhausted prior
to instituting legal action concerning the same procurement transaction unless the
public body agrees otherwise.
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suit against a public body, would preempt a contractual provision
requiring the contractor to submit to the public body's administra-
tive review procedures. 20 2 Although the contract called for prior ex-
haustion of all administrative remedies, the contractor brought suit
in federal district court seeking damages resulting from the denial
of payment for three change orders.20 3 The court of appeals, how-
ever, observed that code section 11-70 clearly stated that a con-
tractor in a dispute with a public body could pursue administrative
remedies or bring an action in the courts. The court held that par-
ties could not enter into a valid contract contrary to the plain
terms of the statute.0 4
Citing code section 11-70(F) which mandates that if administra-
tive procedures are invoked, they must be exhausted prior to insti-
tuting legal action concerning the "same procurement transac-
tion, '2 5 the defendant also argued that the contractor's invocation
of administrative review procedures on a different claim arising
under the same contract required it to exhaust administrative pro-
cedures on the change order claims as well.20 6 The court of appeals
disagreed, reasoning that if administrative procedures were in-
voked those procedures must be exhausted before the contractor
could file a court action on that specific claim. As to other claims
arising under the contract, however, the contractor had the option
to either utilize the administrative scheme or proceed by direct le-
gal action.207
The court of appeals' decision in Schiosser was consistent with
its two other unpublished decisions considering the exhaustion
provisions of the Procurement Act.208 In Gust K. Newberg Con-
struction Co. v. County of Fairfax,0 9 the contractor entered into a
contract with the county which provided three administrative
levels of dispute resolution. Because the contractor repeatedly pur-
sued administrative relief, the court held that the contractor
should exhaust all administrative remedies prior to instituting le-
202. Schlosser, 975 F.2d at 1077.
203. Id. at 1076-77.
204. Id. at 1078.
205. Id. at 1079 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 11-70F (Repl. Vol 1989)).
206. Id. at 1078-79.
207. Id.
208. Gust K. Newberg Construction Co. v. Loven, Nos. 92-1017, 92-1103, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3456 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 1993); Gust K. Newberg Construction Co. v. County of
Fairfax, Nos. 90-2463, 90-2513, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18714 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1991).
209. Nos. 90-2463, 90-2513, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18714 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1991).
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gal action. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the con-
tractor's claims.21 °
In Gust K. Newberg Construction Co. v. Loven,21' the court of
appeals again held that once invoked, a contractor must exhaust
administrative remedies before it institutes legal proceedings.2 12 In
that case the contractor sued the county's engineer in tort claiming
that the engineer's alleged concealment of design defects amounted
to fraud and tortious interference with the contractor's contract
with the owner. The engineer argued that a provision in the
county's contract with the contractor required the exhaustion of
administrative remedies relative to all claims, including any claims
the contractor may have against the engineer. The engineer con-
tended that he was the third-party beneficiary of this provision
and thus could require the contractor to exhaust the administra-
tive remedies set forth in the contract before instituting judicial
proceedings.21 3
The contractor argued that the engineer could not be a third-
party beneficiary because its state registration had lapsed. The
court deferred to the state board, 14 which had primary jurisdiction
over the matter. The board has investigated the contractor's com-
plaints regarding the engineer's violation of registration require-
ments and found no regulatory or statutory violation.2 5
210. Id. at *7. In a later unpublished decision arising out of the same contract, Gust K.
Newburg Construction Co. v. County of Fairfax, Nos. 91-1674, 91-1798, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18478 (4th Cir. Aug. 7, 1992), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
contractor's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). The court of appeals reiterated its earlier position that, under Virginia law, if the
contractor invokes the administrative process, the contractor's allegations of interest and
bias within the administrative process must first be exhausted before the contractor may
seek relief in the courts. Id. at *7.
211. Nos. 92-1017, 92-1103, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3456 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 1993).
212. Id. at *2. While the opinion in Loven did not indicate whether the contractor had
initiated administrative review procedures before filing suit, in light of the court of appeals'
earlier decision in W.M. Schlosser Co, Inc. v. Fairfax County Redevelopment and Housing
Authority, 975 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1992), the contractor had apparently started, but failed
to exhaust, its administrative review option. If not, the Schlosser case would indicate that
the provisions in the contract which required the contractor to advance all claims through
the administrative process would be invalid as they are contrary to the plain terms of Code
Section 11-70. Schlosser 975 F.2d at 1078.
213. Loven, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3456, at *5.
214. The State Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Land Surveyors and Land-
scape Architects has jurisdiction over licensing of architect/engineering firms. See VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54.1-400 to -415 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
215. Loven, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3456, at *6.
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The court also rejected the engineer's argument that the settle-
ment between the contractor and the county discharged its liabil-
ity to the contractor. The settlement agreement explicitly did not
release the defendants in the suit. The court observed that the re-
lease of one of two persons liable in tort for the same property
damage does not discharge the other, unless the parties so in-
tend.218 The court observed no evidence that the contractor in-
tended to release its tort claims against the engineer in its settle-
ment with the county.217
D. Cases Pertaining to Arbitration as the Exclusive Forum for
Dispute Resolution
Several courts recently dealt with whether arbitration provides
the exclusive forum for resolution of construction disputes. In W.
M. Schlosser Co. v. School Board of Fairfax County,215 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether,
under Virginia law, a school board possessed the authority to agree
to arbitrate contractual disputes. If not, the court reasoned, the
contract entered into by the school board providing for arbitration
of all claims, disputes or other matters upon the written demand of
either party was ultra vires and the contractor's motion to compel
arbitration under the terms of the Federal Arbitration Act21e would
be denied.220
Under the traditional Dillon rule, a school board possesses only
those powers expressly granted to it by the General Assembly,
216. Id. at *8 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
217. Loven at *8-9. In Becon Services Corp. v. Fairfax County Redev. and Housing Auth.,
27 Va. Cir. 269 (Fairfax County 1992), a Virginia circuit court also considered the exhaus-
tion requirement of the Procurement Act. In Becon Services, the contractor had submitted
its request as a claim for final decision and stated that it was not invoking the administra-
tive procedures of the contract, but the director of the housing authority denied the claim
and insisted that the contractor exhaust its administrative appeal procedure with the county
executive before filing an action in circuit court. The contractor then sought a declaration
that it could seek judicial relief. The court noted that sections 11-70(E) and (F) of the Code
provide that a contractor need not use the administrative process, but if it does so, it must
exhaust the administrative route before appealing the claims to the court. The contractor
had not invoked the administrative process and, therefore, the court held that it could liti-
gate its claim in the circuit court without first exhausting available administrative remedies.
Becon Services, 27 Va. Cir. at 272.
218. 980 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1992).
219. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1987).
220. W. M. Schlosser, 980 F.2d at 254-55 (citing Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Richmond, F.
& P. and R. & P. R.R. Connection Co., 145 Va. 266, 299, 133 S.E. 888, 898 (1926), and
Richard L. Deal & Assoc., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 618, 299 S.E.2d 346 (1983)).
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those necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and those powers
which are essential and indispensable.2 21 The Constitution of Vir-
ginia did not bestow the power to agree to arbitrate on a school
board, and the parties admitted that the power to agree to arbi-
trate was not essential or indispensable to the school board's func-
tioning. The issue, therefore, was whether the power to agree to
arbitrate could be implied from a power explicitly granted to
school boards.222 Under the Procurement Act, disputes are decided
by the public body and appeals are made through the public
body's administrative procedures or through the courts. The court
of appeals noted there was no provision in the act for disposition
by an arbitrator.223
In W. M. Schlosser the court of appeals observed that the Gen-
eral Assembly had recently amended section 15.1-508 of the Code
of Virginia224 granting to the governing body of a county the ex-
plicit power to enter into contracts containing arbitration provi-
sions.225 Because the General Assembly did not similarly amend a
corresponding code section regarding school boards, the court of
appeals reasoned that the General Assembly had not accorded
school boards with the power to enter arbitration agreements
within their general power to contract.226
The contractor then argued that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempted application of the Dillon rule. The Federal Arbitration
Act prohibits states from placing greater restrictions upon arbitra-
tion provisions than those placed upon other contractual terms.22
The court of appeals concluded that the Dillon rule did not single
out or disproportionately burdened arbitration provisions. There-
fore, federal preemption was not appropriate.2
221. W.M. Schlosser, 980 F.2d at 255 (quoting City of Richmond v Confrere Club, 239 Va.
77, 387 S.E.2d 471 (1990)). The Dillon Rule is a rule of construction applicable in Virginia
when determining the powers of local government. Id.
222. W.M. Schlosser, 980 F.2d at 254-55.
223. Id. at 256.
224. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-508 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
225. W. M. Schlosser, 980 F.2d at 257.
226. Id. The Schlosser court also noted that several circuit courts in Virginia had held
that the power to contract did not include the power to arbitrate. Id. (citing Hanover
County School Board v. Gould c-23-1984 (Hanover County Apr. 4, 1984); Spotsylvania
County School Board v. Sherman Construction Corp., 14 Va. Cir. 333 (Spotsylvania County
1989)).
227. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1987).
228. W.M. Schlosser, 980 F.2d at 259.
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In Sargis & Jones, Ltd. v. Moran Associates,229 the Loundon
County Circuit Court considered whether the defendants lost their
right to. compel arbitration by first utilizing the judicial process.
The contractor filed suit seeking to enforce its mechanic's lien and
to recover for breach of contract. Because the contract was not ref-
erenced in or attached to the bill of complaint, however, defend-
ants' counsel answered the suit without invoking the contract's ar-
bitration provision. Six months later, during the discovery process,
defendants' counsel realized there was an arbitration provision in
the contract and sought to compel arbitration on the breach of
contract claim.230
Although the contractor argued that the defendant waived the
right to compel arbitration by participating in the judicial proceed-
ings, the Sargis court noted that public policy favored arbitration
settlements and that further compelling arbitration on the breach
of contract claim would not prejudice the contractor on the
mechanic's lien claim.2 l Therefore, the court stayed the proceed-
ings on the breach of contract claim and directed the contractor to
proceed to arbitration as required under the contract.232
E. Cases Involving Design Professionals
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
cently decided Transdulles Center, Inc. v. USX Corp.,233 which
raises troubling questions for owners who engage professional de-
signers and are later sued by third parties because of defects in the
plans. Prior to Transdulles, it would have been reasonable to as-
sume that an owner could pass through all liability arising out of
the defective design to the design professional based on principles
of resititution and indemnity.2 4 It also would have been reasona-
229. 27 Va. Cir. 57 (Loudoun County 1992).
230. Id. at 58.
231. Id. at 59 (citing Land v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Va.
1985), and Virginia's adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.01
to -589.16 (1992 Repl. Vol.)).
232. Sargis, 27 Va. Cir. at 60. The Sargis court relied on Virginia Code section 8.01-
581.02(A) which requires a court to order the parties to proceed with arbitration on the
application of one of the parties, a showing of a contract with a valid arbitration clause, and
refusal of the opposing party to arbitrate. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.02(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
233. 976 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1992).
234. See RESTATEiENT OF RESTITUTION § 76 (1937). As noted in the RESTATEhMENT OF RES-
TrrUTON, the common law recognized an implied right of indemnity to recover from a party
upon whom one relied to one's detriment, where that reliance resulted in liability to third
parties. A typical example of implied indemnity at common law is the employee's obligation
7171993]
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ble to assume that the owner could collect attorneys fees and re-
lated costs in defending an action brought by a third party as a
result of malpractice. After Transdulles, these reasonable assump-
tions are invalid, at least in Virginia's federal courts.
In Transdulles, a developer, USX Corp., hired an engineering
firm, Gannett Fleming Civil Engineering, Inc., to design a storm
water drainage system. Gannett Fleming did not design drainage
pipes of sufficient size to handle the expected drainage, thus failing
to comply with the county's Facilities Standards Manual. 3 5
Prior to discovery of the problem, USX sold the property, which
was subsequently resold. The third owner leased the property to
Transdulles Center, Inc. The county required Transdulles to cor-
rect the drainage system. After making substantial repairs, Trans-
dulles sued USX to recover for breach of contract, and USX filed a
third-party action against Gannett Fleming. 36
At trial the jury awarded Transdulles $912,000 in damages from
USX, but awarded USX only $638,400 in damages from Gannett
Fleming. 37
On appeal, Gannett Fleming argued that USX should have been
required to present engineering expert testimony to show that
Gannett Fleming's work deviated from the standard of care, and,
conversely, that Gannett Fleming should have been allowed to pre-
sent certain engineering expert testimony that it had not so devi-
ated. The court of appeals rejected that argument, observing that
the contract between USX and Gannett Fleming required the engi-
neer to design the plans in accordance with the county's applicable
to indemnify the employer for damages the employer must pay to third parties because of
the acts of the employee. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Aetna, 191 Va. 225, 60 S.E.2d
876 (1950).
235. Transdulles, 976 F.2d at 222.
236. Id. at 222-23. Transdulles acquired its contract action against USX by assignment
from the county. USX had entered a "Subdivision Agreement" with the county prior to
construction. The agreement required USX to construct the improvements in accordance
with the county's subdivision and zoning ordinances, which included provisions requiring
adequate storm water drainage on the site. Id.
237. Id. at 223. The Transdulles court dealt with a number of other issues which are not
discussed in this article, including whether the county had the power under the Dillon Rule
to assign its contract right to Transdulles (yes); whether the County's review and recorda-
tion of Gannett Fleming's plans constituted approval such that no breach of contract action
would lie (no); and whether Transdulles's expenses in building a detention pond upstream
to resolve the drainage problem were direct damages that could be recovered in a breach of
contract action (yes). Id. at 224-26.
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storm water regulations.238 The court found that the contract set
an objective standard of care for Gannett Fleming's performance,
the application of which was within the common understanding of
the jury. Thus, expert opinion was not admissible.23 9
The court also considered USX's request for a new trial, based
on the contention that the jury verdict was contrary to the evi-
dence and instructions in that it should have awarded USX dam-
ages against Gannett Fleming equal to the damages awarded
Transdulles against USX. The court of appeals rejected USX's ar-
gument, finding that the dissimilar results were a result of dissimi-
lar evidence. Specifically the court observed that Transdulles's
contract claim rested on the county's Subdivision Agreement,
while USX's claim rested on its separate contract with Gannett
Fleming.240 Further, the jury instructions governing Transdulles's
claim against USX differed from the instructions governing USX's
claim against Gannett Fleming.241 Given the differing instructions,
the differing evidence, and the differing contracts, the court con-
238. Id. at 226.
239. Id. at 227. The Transdulles court cited the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in
Nelson v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 228, 368 S.E.2d 239 (1988), which held that architectural
practice is sufficiently technical as to require an expert to set the standard of care for the
jury in a malpractice action. Transdulles, 976 F.2d at 227. The Fourth Circuit has now
created an exception to the Nelson requirement - where the design professional agrees to
comply with some law or regulation, there is no place for an expert to address the governing
standard the design professional is to meet. In such cases, violation of the local ordinance is,
in effect, negligence per se, a concept the court of appeals.could have used to express the
exception it was creating.
240. Transdulles, 976 F.2d at 227. The court of appeals' recognition of a rational basis for
the dissimilar jury verdicts based on differences in the county's Subdivision Agreement with
USX, and USX's separate engineering contract with Gannett Fleming, is subject to ques-
tion. The Subdivision Agreement required USX to provide an adequate storm drainage sys-
tem. USX's contract with Gannett Fleming required Gannett Fleming to prepare plans in
accordance with the county's storm drainage system regulations. The issue before the trial
court was whether the storm drainage system that was installed conformed with the
county's regulations. There is nothing in the Transdulles opinion to explain how the jury
could have concluded, as the court of appeals suggests, that the county's Subdivision Agree-
ment imposed greater obligations on USX than it imposed on Gannett Fleming in its
contract.
241. Id. The jury in Transdulles was not expressly instructed that if it found against
USX it must by necessity award USX an identical award against Gannett Fleming. Rather,
the instructions permitted the jury to consider independently whether USX had breached
the Subdivision Agreement and, if so, what damages were reasonably foreseeable by the
parties at the time the contract was executed. In addition, the jury could determine whether
Gannett Fleming had breached its engineering contract with USX and, if so, what damages
were reasonably foreseeable at the time that the contract was executed. Id. at 227-28 n.8.
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cluded that the differences in damages were within the discretion
of the jury.242
The court of appeals also considered USX's appeal of the denial
of USX's right to recover attorneys' fees it had to pay Transdulles
and that it incurred in defense of Transdulles' claim.2 43 USX con-
tended it had an implied indemnity right arising out of its contrac-
tual relationship with Gannett Fleming to recover attorneys' fees.
The court rejected USX's indemnity claim observing that no
"unique factors" nor "special relationship" existed between USX
and Gannett Fleming that would support an implied indemnity
right to recover such attorneys' fees.244 In ruling against USX's at-
torneys' fees claim the court held that there was no right in Vir-
ginia to recover one's own attorney's fees in defending a lawsuit
from another party.245
242. Id. at 228. While the court of appeals identified differences in the instructions, con-
tracts, and evidence as potential bases for the inconsistent jury results, it did not explain
how any of these differences demonstrated that the jury had a rational basis for awarding
differing damages to Transdulles and USX. Later in the opinion, in fact, the court asserts
that the jury's failure to pass through all of Transdulles's damages to Gannett Fleming dem-
onstrates that the jury held USX independently responsible for the defective design "to
some unknown degree." Id. at 229. Given that Gannett Fleming agreed contractually to de-
sign the drainage system, that its design turned out to be defective, and that USX incurred
liability for failing to provide a satisfactory design, it is difficult to perceive how a rational
jury could avoid passing through the entire liability to the design professional.
243. Id. at 229. USX's obligation to pay Transdulles's attorneys' fees arose out of an ex-
press contractual provision in the Subdivision Agreement. Id.
244. Id. at 228. In Transdulles, the court cited, but did not follow, General Electric Co. v.
Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960). Moretz recognized
an implied indemnity right in a contract between a carrier and shipper based on federal
statutes and regulations that were to be read into to the contract. Moretz, 270 F.2d at 787.
The court of appeals in Transdulles suggested that Moretz was decided under admiralty law
as if that distinction alone should make a difference. Transdulles, 976 F.2d at 228 (citing
Wingo v. Celotex Corp., 834 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1987)). In fact, Moretz was not based on
admiralty law, although the court in that decision relied on prior U.S. Supreme Court au-
thority, construing admiralty law, as a basis for recognizing an implied indemnity right be-
tween interstate shippers and carriers. Moretz, 270 F.2d at 788 (relying on Ryan Stevedor-
ing Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956)). It is interesting to note that, as in
Moretz, USX based a right of indemnity on a violation of governmental regulation that had
been incorporated into the private contract. In Moretz, the regulations were federal and
pertained to interstate transportation; in Transdulles the regulations were local and per-
tained to storm water drainage design. On this ground it is difficult to see any rational basis
for not applying the indemnity right recognized in Moretz to the situation presented in
Transdulles.
245. Transdulles, 976 F.2d at 228. The court distinguished Hiss v. Friedberg, 201 Va. 572,
112 S.E.2d 871 (1960), on the ground that USX was not the prevailing party in its action
against Transdulles, a necessary prerequisite to recovering attorneys' fees under the Hiss
holding.
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In Schrieider v. Continental Casualty Co., 2 4 6 the court of ap-
peals considered the meaning of an asbestos exclusion provision
contained in a professional liability policy that the insurer, Conti-
nental Casualty (CNA), issued to its insured, Sherertz, Franklin,
Crawford, and Shaffner (SFCS), an architectural and engineering
firm. The policy excluded coverage for any claim arising out of
"failure to detect or advise of the existence or proportion of asbes-
tos. 2 47 SFCS was retained by a prospective purchaser of an apart-
ment building to prepare reports regarding the possible conversion
of the apartment building into retirement housing. After the owner
acquired the building, it incurred substantial costs in abating as-
bestos found inside. The owner thereafter sued SFCS in contract
and tort for allegedly failing to report the possible existence of
asbestos.248
SFCS subsequently settled with the owner, assigning its rights
against CNA for insurance coverage to the owner. The owner
thereafter sued CNA, and CNA asserted the policy's asbestos ex-
clusion as a defense.249
The trial court held that the policy exclusion did not bar the
assigned claim, and the court of appeals reversed. The court of ap-
peals found the plain language of the exclusion was clear and di-
rectly applicable to the owner's claim that SFCS had failed to dis-
cover and warn about the presence of asbestos and the costs
associated with its removal.25 0 The court of appeals found no ambi-
guity in the policy language and refused to interpret the insurance
policy differently from any other contract. As such, the court held
that the trial court erred in admitting expert affidavits that distin-
guished "detecting and advising of the existence of asbestos,"
which the experts contended represented a specialized extra archi-
tectural service within the asbestos exclusion, and the "failure to
warn about the possible existence of asbestos," which the experts
contended represented the breach of a normal architectural service
outside of the exclusion.25 1 Given that the exclusion language was
unambiguous, the court concluded that the trial court erred in per-
246. 989 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1993).
247. Id. at 729.
248. Id.
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mitting the extrinsic expert evidence proffered by the owner and
reversed the jury verdict in favor of the owner.252
F. Workers' Compensation Cases Arising Out of Construction
Under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act,253 a contractor
becomes the "statutory employer" of its subcontractor's employees
when it hires the subcontractor for the execution or performance of
the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the contractor.2
A statutory employer is liable to pay any workers' compensation
award for which it would have been liable if that worker had been
immediately employed by such contractor 55 A subcontractor also
becomes the statutory employer of a sub-subcontractor's
employees. 256
The issue in States Roofing v. Bush Construction Corp.257 was
whether a subcontractor's sister subsidiary was the statutory em-
ployer of a sub-subcontractor's employee, even though there was
no direct contract between the sister subsidiary and either the gen-
eral contractor or the sub-subcontractor. All assets of Eastern
Roofing Corporation ("Eastern"), the subcontractor, were acquired
by Marepcon Financial Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Norshipco.25s The assets were immediately transferred to States
Roofing Corporation, another wholly owned subsidiary of Nor-
shipco. Consistent with its promise to the general contractor,
States Roofing then began to fulfill Eastern's obligations under the
contract.259 When an employee of the uninsured sub-subcontractor
filed a claim with the Industrial Commission, States Roofing ar-
gued that it was not a statutory employer of the claimant because
the requisite contractual relationship did not exist between it and
either the general contractor or the sub-subcontractor.260
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, however, held that States
Roofing's conduct manifested an implied agreement to assume
Eastern's contractual liabilities with the general contractor and
252. Id. at 732.
253. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1991).
254. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-302 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 426 S.E.2d 124 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
258. Id. at 125.




sub-subcontractor.261 States Roofing purchased Eastern's equip-
ment, accounts receivable, contract rights and inventory, and hired
most of Eastern's former employees. Moreover, States Roofing
pledged to complete the Eastern contract, demanded that the sub-
subcontractor perform under the contract, and sought and received
payment from the general contractor. Therefore, the court held
that States Roofing was the statutory employer of the claimant at
the time of his injury.262
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the past two years, the Virginia General Assembly and Vir-
ginia's courts have made numerous changes in the law affecting the
construction industry. The most dramatic changes have occurred
in the law governing prosecution of mechanic's liens and public
procurement claims, the exclusivity and applicability of alternative
dispute remedies, and professional malpractice. The judicial cases
discussed in this article can hopefully teach the practitioner impor-
tant lessons on how to prosecute and defend construction claims
more effectively, and how to avoid procedural and evidentiary
problems that inevitably arise in the course of construction
litigation.
261. Id. at 127 (relying upon City of Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918
F.2d 438, 450 (4th Cir. 1990)).
262. Id.
1993]

